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The First on the Flight Home: 
 The Sad Story of State Aid Control in the Brexit Age 
 
Andrea Biondi 
 
1. From Port Talbot … 
 
Very few specific areas of European law have been singled out in the debate on 
the benefits and costs of the UK’s continued membership of the European Union. 
Certainly the focus has included: free movement of persons and citizenship 
rights; the doctrine of supremacy; the ever-expanding jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union; the UK-EU budget rules ca va san dire; and a few 
others. However, only one has had the, dubious, privilege of being identified by 
both Leave and Remain camps as the most unpleasant for our country: state aid 
law.  In the run up to the referendum, it was to be expected that any news would 
automatically be linked to the debate on whether the UK should Leave or 
Remain. In March 2016, Tata Steel announced its intention to sell the entire Strip 
Products division of its UK steel business, in particular its biggest plant located in 
Port Talbot in Wales. The decision had profound implications and repercussions 
both locally, as the Port Talbot plant was, and still is, the focus of the community 
and local economy, and nationally, for the British steel industry. However the 
pivotal point of the debate was not the deficiency of Tata’s management, or the 
lack of investment in new technology, or China’s competitive price policy, or 
even potential buyers. The focus was on the fact that EU law, specifically state aid 
rules, would be responsible in the event of the plant closing.  On the 23rd of June, 
57% of voters in Neath Port Talbot voted Leave.  
 
In the aftermath of the referendum, the state aid ‘factor’ of the Brexit debate 
continued, and again a consensus within the entire political spectrum seemed to 
emerge. At the Conservative conference held in Birmingham on 2-5 October, the 
current Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Greg 
Clark, stated that one of the advantages of Brexit was that the UK government 
would be free from EU state aid rules which prevent Member State governments 
from supporting businesses. ‘Clearly the state aid rule question and that thicket of 
questions is always there, and I hope that one of the freedoms that will come from 
Brexit will be that we will be able to determine our own view on that rather than 
complying with others ... It is something that is a constraint, clearly a bureaucratic 
constraint ... The ability to look at that again as part of our negotiations seems 
entirely reasonable.’1 
 
Furthermore, on 19 October, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that after 
Brexit the UK can finally free itself of the “constraints” of the EU regime that 
polices illegal subsidies. He also added that, ‘we would want instead a regime that 
allowed us to intervene appropriately but constrained us from intervening 
inappropriately,’2 which is obviously a very sophisticated concept. At the other 
                                                        
 Professor of EU Law, Centre of European Law, King’s College London. 
1 https://www1.dehavilland.co.uk/insight-blog-uk/close-on-conservative-party-conference. 
2 L.Crofts, ‘UK to break from EU constraints after Brexit Hammond says’, in Mlex, 19 Oct 2016. 
end of the political spectrum, Mr Corbyn, Leader of the Opposition, argued last 
September that Brexit could encourage a new approach to enforcing free market 
rules. Essentially, this would mean that, ‘any deal with the EU must recognize that 
the old state aid rules are no longer valid. When governments across the world are 
intervening, it makes no sense to tie a government’s hands here’. 3In response to a 
specific question on the matter, he apparently later explained that he was not 
suggesting that Britain should reject a post-Brexit trade deal with the EU if it 
involved accepting state aid rules, rather, he just wanted Britain to be able to 
adopt a flexible approach to state aid, as Germany, France and Italy appear 
permitted to do. Yet another sophisticated concept. The Shadow Chancellor, Mr 
McDonnell, explained the Labour Party strategy further, on a radio programme. 
He emphasized that the party wanted all businesses to have "access" to the 
single market, but was not prepared to support some aspects such as state aid 
rules,4 subsequently creating expectations that generations of trade lawyers will 
suddenly learn how to square the circle. It appears pretty clear that despite the 
many deep divisions in the post referendum era, we have at least one certainty: 
state aid is the first on the plane home. Still, like in the films where everything 
happens just when the hero or heroine is already boarding the fatal plane, let’s 
make a final plea before bidding farewell to such an old friend, or at least 
acquaintance.5 
 
A Case of Mistaken Identity 
 
One of the main criticisms directed at state aid control, is that it is an 
interference in the legitimate policy making powers of a nation state. The 
political right claim that it prevents deregulation, the cutting of red tape and 
liberalization. The political left claim that it is an irritant frustrating various 
social policies and reducing the possibility of pursuing welfare related goals. 
Funny how things change, and how easy is to forget. Let’s start from the right 
and then move to the left. 
 
State aid rules have existed since the very beginning of the process of European 
legal integration. As a first in the history of trade law, they appeared initially in 
Article 4(c) of the Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community, 
prohibiting any ‘subsidies or state assistance, or special charges imposed by the 
state, in any form whatsoever’. Such a robust stance was confirmed and enhanced 
in the Treaty of Rome, which expanded on this prohibition well beyond coal and 
steel customs duties. The structure of the Treaty has remained essentially the 
same since 1957. What is now Article 107 (1) contains, at least in comparison 
with those days, an amazingly strong precept that ‘any aid granted by a Member 
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
                                                        
3  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/07/jeremy-corbyn-says-uk-should-reject-
key-aspects-of-single-market-after-brexit. 
4  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/27/tories-want-bankers-brexit-deal-john-
mcdonnell-labour. 
5 Some of the ideas expressed here are also contained in A Biondi ‘State Aid, goverement 
spending and the virtue of loyalty’ in P. Birkinshaw & A.Biondi (eds.) ‘Britain Alone?’ Kluwer, 
2016, 291. For a little less idealistic view of state aid rules see N.Zahariadis, ‘Winners and Losers 
in EU State Aid Policy’, in Journal of Industry Competition and Trade (2013) 13, 141. 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member 
States, be incompatible with the internal market’. The Treaty, in its Article 
equivalent to what is now Article 108 TFEU, also transferred the ‘surevellaince’ 
of such a provision to a supranational referee, the European Commission. 
‘Amazing’ is probably the right word, considering that the six founding Member 
States’ economic (and industrial) policies were largely led, if not directly 
controlled, by national governments. State aid control was therefore inserted as 
an essential tool to fight protectionism and promote cooperation between what 
remained six very isolated entities, in terms of market openness. The 
government driven industrial model of those states and the various economic 
crises, certainly contributed to a very slow start to the application of state aid 
rules. As is well documented,6 it was only in the mid-eighties, with the emphasis 
being on the achievement of the internal market, generally influenced by neo-
liberalism becoming policy, that the European institutions started to take state 
aid rules seriously. Paradoxically, mostly due to Anglo-Saxon and Celtic 
influence.  
 
In 1985, the Irish Peter Sutherland was appointed Commissioner for 
Competition, followed by the British Leon Brittan in 1989. Under both their 
tenures, the Commission pursued a much more robust state aid policy. For 
instance, it ‘created’ and developed a new remedy. With the backing of the 
European Court of Justice, 7 the European Commission started requiring the 
‘guilty’ Member State to take all necessary measures to recover the aid from the 
beneficiary, in the case of unlawfully granted State aid. 8  The obligation on 
Member States was indentified as a duty to recover the sums owed in order to 
eliminate the distortion of competition caused by the competitive advantage 
procured by the unlawful aid. The ‘rationale’ behind such obligation was also a 
desire to put pressure on Member States to comply with the rules with at least 
some form of sanction eventually introduced. There is also a second function to 
recovery actions, which is sometimes overlooked: ensuring the equality of 
Member States before the law. In other words, and more explicitly, recovery 
actions, with all their imperfections, are aimed at reassuring the virtuous 
Member States that the other States which are more casual with public money 
will be punished for their profligacy.  
 
Naming and Shaming tactics may be primitive, but they alert investors, deter 
potentially unworthy beneficiaries and increase market transparency. Moreover, 
bona pace Corbyn, the usual suspects of France, Germany, Spain, Portugal and 
Italy also paid rather a lot of money into the EU coffers for repeated violations of 
state aid rules because the Court of Justice condemned them all to pay lump 
                                                        
6 See M Merola, ‘The Forces Shaping State Aid Control in the EU’, in L. Rubini & J. Hawkins (eds) 
‘What Shapes the Law? Reflections on the History, Law, Politics and Economics of International and 
European Subsidy Disciplines’- e-book, EUI-University of Birmingham, 2016, 101. 
7 See for instance Case C -52/84 Commission v Belgium [1986] ECR 89. 
8The specific rules on the action for recovery are now codified  in Article 14(1) of the Procedural 
Regulation Procedural Regulation of 2013 [OJ L 204 of 31.07.2013, p. 15 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 659/1999,1. See also in general E. Righini, ‘Godot is here: recovery as an 
effective State aid remedy’, in Liber amicorum Francisco Santaolalla Gadea, EC State Aid Law, 
Kluwer Law International, 2008, 200. 
sums and penalties under the specific procedure provided for by Article 260 
TEFU, as a consequence of the non compliance with judgments requiring the 
recovery of aid. 9 
 
In the mid–eighties and, and in particular under Commissioner Brittan, state aid 
‘rationale’ also started to change. The emphasis was increasingly placed on the 
idea that state aid rules had to be considered an essential tool to guarantee the 
‘equality’, not only of Member States, but of the market place as well. State aid 
rules were then perceived as essential in preventing the waste of public 
resources on policies or on undertakings that the market would never support. 
The inherent link between state aid and competition rules was therefore 
increasingly strengthened. And these were the years in which the Commission – 
with the support of the Court took aim against traditional industrial policy 
makers such as French banks, 10and gigantic Italian public holding companies, 
including IRI.11 This tendency has been confirmed over the years and has 
arguably experienced some moments even of excessive enthusiasm, whereby 
state aid was nearly replaced with an antitrust approach with efficiency as the 
ultimate goal. State aid rules were therefore to be used to prevent inefficient 
undertakings surviving artificially in a competitive market, to the detriment of 
more efficient operators.12  
 
Without reaching this extreme, the current system is firmly based on the idea 
that national policies, which are pro-business, should never fall foul of state aid 
rules. For instance, in the recent Notice on the notion of State Aid, the 
Commission reiterated that in determining whether or not an element of aid can 
be detected, national economic policies will be tested on whether the State has 
granted an advantage to an undertaking by not acting like a market economy 
operator with regard to a certain transaction. The Notice clarifies that, ‘it is not 
relevant whether the intervention constitutes a rational means for the public 
bodies to pursue public policy (for example employment) considerations. Similarly, 
the profitability or unprofitability of the beneficiary is not in itself a decisive 
indicator for establishing whether or not the economic transaction in question is in 
line with market conditions. The decisive element is whether the public bodies 
acted, as a market economy operator would have done in a similar situation. If this 
is not the case, the beneficiary undertaking has received an economic advantage 
which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions, placing it in a 
more favourable position compared to that of its competitors. 13Such a pro-
business approach is also reinforced by a further new development gradually 
emerging in the years of economic and financial crises: the Modernization of 
State Aid. As the last grand plan elaborated by Commissioner Almunia, it is based 
on the idea that the State should be freed from state aid control if engaged in 
                                                        
9For some statistics see Biondi, State Aid Control, Government Spending and the Virtue of Loyalty, 
cit. above. 
10 Case C-290/83 Commission v France [1985] ECR I-445. 
11 Case C-305/89 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR I-01603. 
12 SAAP, State Aid Action Plan,  see further T. Kleiner, “The State Aid Action Plan”, in W. Mederer., 
N. Pesaresi, M. Van Hoof (eds), EU Competition Law, State Aid (2008) Claeys & Casteels, Volume 
IV, Book I, p. 65.  
13 C-2016 Commission Notice on the notion of Aid ex Art 107 (1) TFEU OJC 262, 19.07.2016, p.18. 
promoting ‘worthy’ objectives.14  It advocates that public spending should 
become more efficient, effective and targeted at growth-promoting policies that 
fulfil common European objectives. From research and development and 
innovation, to risk capital, broadband, regional aid, aviation, energy and the 
environment, all are worthy for States to feel free to invest.15 Let’s take the 
example of the energy market, which has, despite many efforts, been essentially 
waterproof from any form of antitrust enforcement. The Commission simply 
acknowledged that government support, including support to facilitate the drive 
towards renewable energy sources, is unavoidable. It adopted the Energy and 
Environmental State Aid Guidelines, which provides significant opportunities to 
the State to play the role of entrepreneur, and only inserted some mild market–
friendly rules, such as requiring Member States to grant aid only through a 
competitive bidding process from 2017.16 In short, from the perspective of 
deregulated markets with business incentives, state aid rules should be seen as 
non-problematic.  
 
Let’s now move to the left, where rules controlling state aid can prevent socially 
responsible policies. This is a view that gives a very partial and incomplete 
account of the complexity of the system. First of all, state aid control rules are 
consistent with the constitutional settlement embodied by the Treaty of Rome. 
The model sketched in the original European Treaties was certainly based on a 
perhaps naïve and optimistic attempt to devise an efficient but fair supranational 
social market economy model, with its checks and balances between the 
promotion of economically virtuous policies and the preservation of certain core 
national welfare values. Nonetheless, the basic provisions of the Treaty were not, 
and still are not, neutral. They are clearly based on the imperative of promoting 
‘steady steady expansion, balanced trade and fair competition.17 A particular 
strident cause for conflicts has therefore always been the mismatch between the 
considerable powers vested in the EU, as the supranational actor, to impose on 
its Member States, strict market rules unaccompanied by equally effective 
instruments apt to promote social values.18  
 
However, even in this context, state aid rules are paradoxically, the least 
problematic. First, the Treaty itself offers a wide array of possibilities. Article 
107(2) contains a series of grounds that automatically render the aid compatible 
with EU law, while paragraph (3) lists a series of grounds that could make the aid 
compatible. Consequently, it is abundantly possible for Member States to show 
that even measures that involve a degree of selective financial support are 
however fully justified in pursuance of the general interest. The Commission 
                                                        
14Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2012) 209 Final, 8 May 
2012. 
15 For a list of the measures adopted so far see 
www.ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/modernisation/index_. 
16 Communication 2014/C 200/01 – Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and 
energy OJ C 200, 28.6.2014, p. 1–55. 
17 EEC Treaty Preamble. 
18 The literature on these issues is immense. For an overview of some of the issues see D. 
Damjanovic ‘The EU market rule as Social Market Rules: Why the EU can be a Social Market 
Economy’ in (2013) 50 CMLRev, 1685. 
decisional practice reflects this and it would be enough to point to the, 
admittedly flawed but still vital, regional funds system, or the entire employment 
related state aid policy, where invariably support has been lent to Member States 
in order to protect regional solidarity19 and to combat unemployment or favour 
youth employment.20  Over the years, the Commission has also approved 
innumerable rescue and restructuring plans, acknowledging the positive impact 
of such aid. 21  
 
The Court of Justice, usually so reluctant to draw any boundaries as to the 
application of EU law which relates to areas of national regulatory competence, 
is instead particularly restrained when dealing with the application of state aid 
rules to national social policies. It famously excluded, in the Altmark judgment, 
the application of state aid rules when state support can be considered as 
compensation for the performance of a public service obligation.22This case law 
incidentally provided the European Commission with some kind of legal basis for 
adopting a series of measures that ex ante exclude the applicability of state aid 
rules to social services. 23Even outside the area of universal public services 
obligations, social policy considerations have usually received much more 
attention than under classic free movement provisions, for example. 24  The Court 
of Justice famously found in a trio of labour law cases that legislative provisions 
legislations adopted for social and employment purposes could not be 
considered to constitute State aid.25  Recently, the General Court had to decide 
whether additional redundancy payments, which were included in the costs to 
be incurred in the event of company liquidation, amounted to state aid. 26The 
Court found that, ‘in a social market economy, a reasonable private investor would 
not disregard … the development of the social, economic and environmental 
context in which it continues to develop … The long-term economic rationale of a 
                                                        
19 See M Merola, ‘Regional aid: recent trends and some historical background’, in Eur. State Aid 
Law Q. 9(3), (2010) 589. 
20 L. Tebano.  ‘State Aid for Employment after the New General Block Exemption Regulation’, in 
Eur. State Aid Law Q. 14 (2015) , 241 
21 See the statistics s reported at http://www.oxera.com/Latest-Thinking/Agenda/2016/Brexit-
implications-for-state-aid-rules.aspx. Oxera calculated that, employment generally falls by 
around 30% whereas output falls by almost 20% over the three years post-distress. Oxera 
‘Should aid be granted to firms in difficulty? A study on counterfactual scenarios to restructuring 
state aid’, prepared for the European Commission, December, 2009. Another study is quoted 
telling us that on regional assistance programmes in the UK found that a 10% increase in state 
subsidies led to a 7% increase in manufacturing employment in the region where the aid was 
granted Criscuolo, C., Martin, R., Overman, H. and Van Reenen, J. (2012), ‘The Causal Effects of an 
Industrial Policy’, National Bureau of Economic Research.  
22  Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg (Altmark), 
ECLI:EU:C2003:415, 
23 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/public_services_en.html. 
24 Cfr Case C-438/05 Viking Line Abp, [2007] ECR I- 10779. 
25 Joined Cases C-72/91 and C-73/91, Sloman Neptun [1993] ECR I-887; Joined Cases C-52/97, C-
53/97 Case C-189/91, Kirsammer-Hack [1993] ECR I-6195 and C-54/97, Viscido [1998] ECR I-
2629. 
26Case T-565/08, Corsica Ferries France SAS v. Commission, EU: T: 2012:415, upheld by the Court 
of Justice in Case C-533/12 P, SNCM SA and French Republic v. Corsica Ferries France SA, EU: C: 
2014:2142, annotated by G Galletti, ‘How Reasonable a Private Investor Can Be Assumed to Be? 
Corsica Ferries France’, in 52 CMLRev (2015) 1095. 
 
reasonable private entrepreneur’s conduct cannot therefore be assessed without 
taking account of such concerns’ .27 These employment relationship rules could 
and should therefore be included in the assessment as to whether a measure is 
to be qualified as state aid.   
 
State Aid is Better Than it Seems 
 
The arguments made above could be contested and turned on their head, as it is 
nearly impossible to scientifically define more than fifty years of law and policy 
development. However, I would like to argue that there is a dimension of state 
aid law that is very often, perhaps deliberately, neglected: transparency.  
 
One very important facet of state aid control is that it is procedural. Member 
States are under an obligation under Article 108 TFEU to notify any new planned 
aid to the Commission, and then enter into negotiations to secure approval. The 
initial step is akin to pre-trail discovery when facts, documents, and depositions 
need to be disclosed. Even in those cases where notification is not required, 
Member states are still expected to be as transparent as possible. For instance, 
Member States are now required to publish all individual awards of aid that 
exceed EUR 0.5 million. 28 
 
A long-held conviction, is that one of the questions of modern democracy is the 
opacity of the allocation of public resources. The United Kingdom, despite some 
propaganda on its openness, is not immune from this disease. In a truly revealing 
study, Prof. Farnsworth, has demonstrated the extent of this problem. Whilst 
there is a relatively open discussion and available data on spending on social 
welfare, there is vitally a sort of omerta when dealing with what Farnsworth calls 
‘the corporate welfare state’, meaning all public policies that ‘directly or 
indirectly meet the specific needs or preferences of private business.’ 29There are 
a myriad of instruments that are available, from start-up grants to tax breaks or 
amnesties, loans for new investments and so on. These state interventions might 
not necessarily be bad, but there is usually very little openness and democratic 
control. When attempts are made to impose scrutiny, they are usually fiercely 
contested.30  
 
Contrarily, state aid control is based on disclosure. As a case in point, there were, 
and still are, many negative repercussions from the financial crises that affected 
the whole of the European banking sector. In the aftermath of the first wave of 
banking disasters, state aid control was essentially reduced to an act of rubber 
stamping by the Commission, which usually took less than twenty-four hours to 
approve very complex rescue plans, such as Northern Rock. However, to the 
Commission’s credit, some firm and clearer principles on how to control aid 
                                                        
27 Case T-565/08, above, para 82. 
28 See Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 (GBER). 
29 K. Farnsworth, ‘Public policies for private corporations: the British corporate welfare state’, 
Renewal, vol.21, 51. 
30See Dame M. Hodge ‘Called to Account: How Corporate Bad Behaviour and Government Waste 
Combine to Cost us Millions’ Little, Brown Book Group (2016). 
granted to banks are eventually emerging. 31 These are, in my view, far from 
perfect, and in some cases simply wrong. However, notification of the support 
measures given to banks and their subjection to state aid control obliged 
Member States to be open about the support and assistance provided.  
 
Similarly, the uproar caused by the Apple and other Commission tax decisions is 
equally revealing. In a series of investigations, the Commission found individual 
tax rulings granted by Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to involve State 
aid. This was because they provided selective advantages to a specific company 
or group of companies influencing the allocation of taxable profit between 
subsidiaries of a group located in different countries.32 The calculations used to 
set the tax base allegedly rely on the remuneration of a subsidiary or a branch, 
not on market terms, therefore providing favourable treatment to the company 
as compared with other taxpayers. In particular, the national tax authorities fully 
endorsed transfer-pricing arrangements proposed by the taxpayer himself for 
determining the taxable basis of an integrated group company. By agreeing to 
schemes that accept multinational corporations pricing their intra-group 
transactions in a manner that does not reflect the conditions that apply between 
ordinary companies, the national authorities, according to the Commission, 
granted an unfair competitive advantage to those multinationals. There are some 
specific questions as to the legality and compatibility with EU law of the 
Commission’s decisions, which the EU Courts will assess. However, there is no 
doubt that these decisions prompted a very important debate on transparency 
and fairness of national policies. It is a basic question of national and 
supranational democracy: a market should not just be efficient and 
technologically advanced, but equal and fair, in the sense that all its operators 
should be taxed fairly. 
 
4.… to Sunderland  
 
One of the current activities of both EU and non-EU law specialists, is to imagine 
post-Brexit scenarios. If we engage in this activity with state aid, there are 
essentially two possibilities: first, an agreement which would include state aid 
control in some form, and second, an agreement without state aid. Many blogs 
have already identified how most of the possible models that have been 
mentioned as an alternative to EU membership in reality include state aid 
provisions.33 The EEA, often mentioned, is unlikely to be considered satisfactory 
because it is exactly the same as membership of the EU. Article 61 of the EEA is 
substantially identical to Article 107, and the EFTA Court has interpreted it 
                                                        
31 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules 
to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (‘Banking 
Communication’) (OJ 2013, C 216, p. 1) partially transformed in hard law by Directive 
2014/59/EU on recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms ("BRRD"), OJ 
L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190. 
32Ireland for Apple Sales International and of Apple Operations Europe; the Netherlands for 
manufacturing activities of Starbucks Manufacturing EMEA BV Luxembourg for the financing 
activities of Fiat Finance and Trade Luxembourg for the activities of Amazon, at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-663_en.htm. The recovery decision against Apple is 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2923_en.htm 
33 See G Peretz at www.monckton.com/state-aid-post-brexit/. 
consistently and in light of the case law of the European Court of Justice.34 
Switzerland seems to offer more hope in a life without state aid, as none of the 
bilateral agreements that the Confederation has with the EU mentions state aid, 
except: the 1972 Free Trade Agreement and the 1999 Agreement on Air 
Transport. Unfortunately, even Switzerland is very well aware of the possible 
state aid dimension of its own national policies. For instance, it has recently 
introduced a reform to its tax system, which is proposing to abolish 
arrangements for status companies under corporate tax law which is no longer 
acceptable under EU state aid rules.35 It is also very likely that EU will insist in 
the insertion of some state aid rules in any kind of agreement.36The final option 
is to fall back on WTO rules. In this latter scenario, the provisions of the SCM 
agreement would be applicable. There are many similarities between the notion 
of subsidy and that of aid and the interpretation of the WTO appellate body has, 
over the years, narrowed the textual differences further.37 However, unlike EU 
law, there is no procedure under which subsidies or other forms of state support 
are notified and approved by the WTO.  The WTO rules apply ex post, once a 
dispute before the WTO Appellate body is opened between states, and of course 
no recovery of the unlawful aid can be ordered but only retaliatory measures can 
be taken by the victorious party. No to mention that a WTO procedure takes an 
infinite time.  
 
In conclusion, one way or another it could be argued that it would be impossible 
for the UK to get rid of state aid control. However, my argument is different: a 
state aid control free model is not crime, worse, it is a mistake. 38 First, the 
absence of state aid rules would not automatically mean an increase in public 
spending. It is well documented that the UK grants traditional sectors 
significantly less support than most other EU states. The exception however, is 
the financial sector. Essentially State aid per capita is therefore much lower than 
in the rest of Europe.39 It also open to debate whether –in the absence of any 
trade agreement - companies might end up paying  more in tariffs  than what 
they might receive in aid. Second, business and commercial operators would still 
seek the degree of independence and impartiality that the European Commission 
has so far guaranteed. Interestingly, many practitioners are already suggesting 
that powers should be transferred to the Competition and Markets Authority. 
Third, and most importantly, there are some compelling ‘constitutional’ 
imperatives. As the recent controversy surrounding the decision by Nissan to 
invest in the Sunderland plant, and the immediate rumors that a preferential 
deal was offered by the Government behind closed doors indicates, the lack of 
any control on public spending could mean a return to arbitrary and 
                                                        
34E.g. Joined Cases E-17/10 and 6/11 Liechtenstein and VTM Fund Management v ESA. 
 
35 https://www.efd.admin.ch/efd/en/home/dokumentation/nsb-news_list.msg-id-64281.html 
36 See L Borlini, ‘State Aid Control and Subsidies Regulation in EU Agreements: Substance, 
Procedure and Policy Space in the ‘New Generation’ EU FTAs’, in G. Ziccardi Capaldo (ed.) The 
Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence 2016, OUP, 2016 
37 L Rubini ‘The wide and the narrow gate: benchmarking in the SCM Agreement after the Canada 
– Renewable Energy/FIT ruling’, in World Trade Review 14(02), 211. 
38 Apologies to Joseph Fouche’. 
39 The average amount spent by the UK on aid is approximately €90 per capita compared with 
€170–€240 per capita in Germany, France and Belgium. See Oxera, cit above. 
protectionist industrial policy.  
 
The state aid rules that EU law has imposed so far on the UK attempted to avoid 
a situation whereby the government of the day would pass legislation to favour 
only certain industries and invest according to their priorities. These rules are 
based on transparency, balancing differing interests, regulatory impact 
assessments and value-for-money tests, and forced the state to behave within 
certain pre-determined parameters. Without EU coordinated state aid policy, 
deals between governments and firms are up for grabs, with high income regions 
and big corporations in a definite position of advantage. It will also need to be 
shA truly serious industrial policy does not therefore depend on the absence of 
state aid control but rather on reform of corporate governance in order to 
promote fairness, and openness. These are criteria which reward companies that 
add social value, location policies aimed at improving the distribution of trade 
and investment and decisions that preserve regional solidarity. So stop that 
plane, it is leaving without state aid! 
 
 
